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Feminism and Economic Inequality 
Katharine T. Bartlett† 
Introduction  
Economic inequality was a key issue in the 2016 presidential 
campaign1 and probably influenced the election of Donald Trump.2  
It is an issue that is profoundly significant to the growing number 
of individuals—disproportionately women and minorities—who 
find themselves on the wrong end of the increasingly bi-modal 
economic spectrum, and raises serious concerns about the erosion 
of the “American dream”3 and the stability and viability of our 
democracy.4  Economists, political theorists, sociologists, and 
 
 †. A. Kenneth Pye Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law.  It is a 
great privilege to have participated in this symposium honoring the most 
influential legal feminist scholar of our time—Catharine A. MacKinnon.  Thank 
you to the editors of Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice for their 
many efforts to make it happen.  
 1. E.g. Josh Boak, Why Income Equality Matters in This Election, PBS 
NEWSHOUR (Aug. 18, 2016, 1:24 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/
income-inequality-matters-election/; David Lauter, Income Inequality Emerges as 
Key Issue in 2016 Presidential Campaign, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2015, 4:00 AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-campaign-income-20150205-story.html; 
Kenneth T. Walsh, Class Wars: Presidential Candidates Will Capitalize on the 
Electorate’s Frustration., U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Jan. 8, 2016, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2016/01/08/this-election-is-about-
class-struggle. 
 2. Zsolt Darvas & Konstantinos Efstathiou, Income Inequality Boosted Trump 
Vote, BRUEGEL (Nov. 9, 2016), http://bruegel.org/2016/11/income-inequality-
boosted-trump-vote/. 
 3. See David Leonhardt, The American Dream, Quantified at Last, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/08/opinion/the-american-dream-
quantified-at-last.html (summarizing research comparing earnings of those born in 
1940, nearly all of whom made more than their parents, with those born in 1980, 
only half of whom made more than their parents). 
 4. See Florian Jung & Uwe Sunde, Income, Inequality, and the Stability of 
Democracy—Another Look at the Lipset Hypothesis, 35 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 52, 52 
(2014); Jedediah Purdy, Wealth and Democracy, NOMOS (forthcoming), draft at 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6196&context=faculty_
scholarship; Erika Eichelberger, The Head of the IMF Says Inequality Threatens 
Democracy. Here Are 7 Charts Proving She’s Right., MOTHER JONES (May 28, 2014, 
9:59 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2014/05/imf-christine-lagarde-income-
inequality; Ray Williams, Why Income Inequality Threatens Democracy, 
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (Aug. 12, 2015), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/wired-
success/201508/why-income-inequality-threatens-democracy.  This is not a new 
concern.  See, e.g., Edward N. Muller, Democracy, Economic Development, and 
Income Inequality, 53 AM. SOC. REV. 50, 50 (1988) (finding strong causal 
association between income equality and democratic regime stability over time).  
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media pundits have kept the issue in the headlines.5  Yet, despite 
an impressive strand of earlier feminist work that made economic 
analysis central to an understanding of women’s subordination,6 
few feminist legal scholars in recent years have had much to say 
about it.7  Indeed, one of the central criticisms of feminism today is 
 
For a descriptive analysis of the growing discontent with democracy globally, see 
Roberto Stefan Foa & Yascha Mounk, The Democratic Discontent, 27 J. 
DEMOCRACY 5 (July 2016).  See also David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, 
Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 4 (2014) 
(describing the tension between neoliberal market imperatives and “democratic 
demands”); Wolfgang Streeck, The Crises of Democratic Capitalism, 71 NEW LEFT 
REV. 5, 5 (2011) (arguing that “the ‘Great Recession’ and the subsequent near 
collapse of public finances [is] a manifestation of a basic underlying tension in the 
political-economic configuration of advanced-capitalist societies”). 
 5. See, e.g., Robert J. Shiller, Today’s Inequality Could Easily Become 
Tomorrow’s Catastrophe, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/08/28/upshot/todays-inequality-could-easily-become-tomorrows-catastrophe.
html; Peter Georgescu, Capitalists, Arise: We Need to Deal With Income Inequality, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/09/opinion/sunday/
capitalists-arise-we-need-to-deal-with-income-inequality.html.  Even the Pope has 
spoken.  Zachary A. Goldfarb & Michelle Boorstein, Pope Francis Denounces 
‘Trickle-Down’ Economic Theories in Sharp Criticism of Inequality, WASH. POST 
(Nov. 26, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/pope-francis-
denounces-trickle-down-economic-theories-in-critique-of-inequality/2013/11/26/
e17ffe4e-56b6-11e3-8304-caf30787c0a9_story.html?utm_term=.64cddd3eafd0; 
Alexander C. Kaufman, Pope Francis: ‘Inequality is the Root of Social Evil’, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 28, 2014, 2:52 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2014/04/28/pope-francis-tweet-inequality_n_5227563.html. 
 6. Some of the classic feminist works addressing class and economic inequality 
from the 1970s include ZILLAH R. EISENSTEIN, CAPITALIST PATRIARCHY AND THE 
CASE FOR SOCIALIST FEMINISM (1979); SHULAMITH FIRESTONE, THE DIALECTIC OF 
SEX (1971); JULIET MITCHELL, WOMEN’S ESTATE (1973).  For a close differentiation 
of alternative feminist visions that take account of feminism’s relationship to class 
oppression, including Marxism, radical feminism, and socialist feminism, see 
generally ALISON M. JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE (1983).  On 
the relationship between Marxism and feminism, see Heidi I. Hartmann, The 
Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism: Towards a More Progressive Union, 
in FEMINIST FRAMEWORKS: ALTERNATIVE THEORETICAL ACCOUNTS OF THE 
RELATIONS BETWEEN WOMEN AND MEN 172 (Alison M. Jaggar & Paula S. 
Rothenberg eds., 2d ed. 1984) (“The ‘marriage’ of marxism and feminism has been 
like the marriage of husband and wife depicted in English common law: Marxism 
and feminism are one, and that one is marxism.”). 
 7. Among the exceptions are feminist legal scholars in the field of labor law.  
See, e.g., Marion Crain, Unionism, Law, and the Collective Struggle for Economic 
Justice, in WORKING AND LIVING IN THE SHADOW OF ECONOMIC FRAGILITY 101 
(Marion Crain & Michael Sherraden eds. 2014).  Feminism has been criticized for 
some time for its inattention to economic inequality issues.  See, e.g., Amelia 
Gentleman, Inequality in the Pursuit of Feminism, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2013) 
(“[F]eminism . . . has failed working-class women by focusing obsessively on 
equality in the boardroom and the faltering race to break the glass ceiling.”).  This 
failing is not limited to feminist scholars.  Despite its commitment to issues of 
equality, even this journal, Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice, 
has not made wealth or income equality a priority.  Indeed, scanning the table of 
contents for this journal for the past 20 years, I was surprised to find not a single 
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that feminists have too often ignored the pocketbook issues of the 
working class, such as labor protections, wages, safety-net issues, 
and health care, in favor of advancing the social issues of the more 
well-off, like abortion rights, environmentalism, and transgender 
bathrooms.8  Even when class issues take center stage, most 
progressives have focused on the poor and not the working class.9 
This Article celebrates the foundational work of Catharine A. 
MacKinnon by identifying the theoretical tools she has given 
feminist legal scholars that would be useful in bringing economic 
inequality to center stage.  It does not itself develop a full theory of 
economic inequality—that is both beyond any expertise I bring to 
the table and the page limit I have been given.  What it does, 
instead, is to review the current relationship between legal 
feminism and economic inequality issues, outline the deficiencies 
in this relationship, and suggest the relevance of the work of 
 
article dedicated specifically to the issue.  A 2007 conference on wealth inequality 
sponsored by the UNC Center on Poverty, Work, and Opportunity stands out for its 
attention to economic inequality.  See Wealth Inequality and the Eroding Middle 
Class: A Conference of the University of North Carolina Center on Poverty, Work 
and Opportunity and the American Constitution Society for Law and Policy, 15 
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 411 (2008).  More recently, see Law and Inequality: 
An American Constitutional Society Conference at Yale Law School October 16 and 
17, 2015, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 233 (2016).  Neither of these conferences 
specifically addressed feminism.  
 8. See, e.g., Kathleen Geier, Inequality Among Women Is Crucial to 
Understanding Hillary’s Loss, THE NATION (Nov. 11, 2016), https://
www.thenation.com/article/inequality-between-women-is-crucial-to-understanding-
hillarys-loss/; see also JEFFREY BERRY, THE NEW LIBERALISM: THE RISING POWER 
OF CITIZEN GROUPS (1999) (describing a shift from the “materialism” of leftist 
groups in the past to “post-materialism” of today’s left, which is focused on social 
causes); JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: HOW 
WASHINGTON MADE THE RICH RICHER—AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE 
CLASS 145–46 (2010); Gentleman, supra note 7 (contending that feminists have 
been too focused on the glass ceiling and not focused enough on working-class 
women); Dani Rodrik, The Abdication of the Left, PROJECT SYNDICATE (July 11, 
2016), https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/anti-globalization-backlash-
from-right-by-dani-rodrik-2016-07 (“Economists and technocrats on the 
left . . . abdicated too easily to market fundamentalism and bought in to [sic] its 
central tenets”). 
 9. As an example, Joan Williams explains that Obamacare—the greatest 
progressive achievement of the last eight years—gave health insurance to the poor 
while failing to provide subsidies to members of the working class who were not 
considered poor enough for state subsidies, and their insurance rates went up.  
Over a quarter of poor families receive child-care subsidies which are, Williams 
states, largely unavailable to the working class, which serves to breed enormous 
resentment of the poor by the lower middle class working poor.  Joan C. Williams, 
What So Many People Don’t Get About the U.S. Working Class, HARV. BUS. REV. 
(Nov. 10, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/11/what-so-many-people-dont-get-about-the-u-
s-working-class. 
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Catharine A. MacKinnon to move toward a more unified thinking 
about gender and economic inequality. 
I. The Statistics 
The statistics are familiar and not disputed. The top 1% of 
households in this wealthy country pull in one-fifth of the nation’s 
income,10 and own nearly 42% of the nation’s wealth.11  As the U.S. 
economy has grown over the last thirty-five to forty years, 
economic inequality has only increased.  From 1980 to 2014 the 
average national income grew by 61% yet the average income of 
earners in the bottom 50%, adjusted for inflation, has actually 
fallen.12  During this same period, income rose an average of 121% 
for those in the top 10%, 205% for the top 1%, and 636% for the top 
0.001%.13  Nearly 70% of the gains in income since 1980 have gone 
to those in the top 10% of the income scale, the lion’s share of 
those to the top 1%.14  Today, the average income-earner in the top 
1% earns eight times more than the average worker in the bottom 
half—a disparity comparable to some of the world’s poorest 
economies such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central 
African Republic, and Burundi.15 
II. Economic Inequality as a Woman’s Issue 
When it is said that economic inequality is a woman’s issue, 
what is generally meant is that women are disproportionately 
poor.  And, of course, they are.  Women are 32% more likely to be 
poor than men, and single mothers are twice as likely to be poor as 
single fathers.16  In part, this is due to the gender gap in wages.  
Women’s median weekly earnings amount to only 82.5% of men’s 
 
 10. THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 296 (2014). 
 11. Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States 
Since 1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data 24 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 20625, 2014), http://www.nber.org/papers/
w20625.pdf. 
 12. Thomas Piketty et al., Economic Growth in the United States: A Tale of Two 
Countries, WASH. CTR. FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH (Dec. 6, 2016), http://
equitablegrowth.org/research-analysis/economic-growth-in-the-united-states-a-tale-
of-two-countries/. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id.  For further detailed data and analysis, see Saez & Zucman, supra note 
11. 
 16. TIMOTHY CASEY, WOMEN’S POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES, 2013 1 (2014), 
https://www.legalmomentum.org/resources/women%E2%80%99s-poverty-united-
states-2013. 
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earnings working the same hours in the same occupations.17  
Moreover, women are concentrated in jobs that are the least well 
paid, such as secretarial and personal care services, as compared 
to the relatively highly paid job categories of construction and 
repair services.18  Even within the same industry groups, women 
are over-represented in the lower-paying job categories.  In the 
legal profession, for example, women make up only 33% of 
lawyers, while they comprise over 87% of paralegals and legal 
assistants.19  Women also have the least control over the terms of 
their employment.  Some 30% of women face mandatory overtime 
they do not want, while many others are forced to accept part-time 
rather than full-time employment.20 
Another sense in which income inequality might be said to be 
a woman’s issue is that women’s political rights appear to 
correlate with the health of their nation’s economy.  A major 
United Nations study in 2014 reported that societies with low 
measures of women’s equality have lower growth and weaker 
economies, as compared to countries with higher measures of 
women’s equality.21  While this association suggests that 
improving the rights of women might reduce poverty,22 the matter 
is more complex.  First, it is not clear that the link between 
women’s rights and growth economies is causal; it may be that 
healthier economies produce greater measures of equality, but not 
vice versa.  Second, even if gains in the rights of women facilitate 
economic growth, this does not mean that the benefits of economic 
growth will flow proportionately to women.  Thomas Piketty in his 
book Capital in the Twenty-First Century makes a compelling case 
that, without the especially rapid growth associated with wars or 
great economic shocks, or without significant government 
 
 17. The figure is lower among African-American women (90%) and Hispanics 
(89%).  U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE: A 
DATABOOK 2–3, 61 tbl.16 (2015), https://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/womens-data
book/archive/women-in-the-labor-force-a-databook-2015.pdf. 
 18. Id. at 51, 55, 58, 69, 70, 71 tbls.14 &18. 
 19. Id. at 37 tbl.11. 
 20. See Deborah Dinner, Beyond “Best Practices”: Employment Discrimination 
Law in the Neoliberal Era, 92 IND. L.J. 1, 53–54 (forthcoming Spring 2017). 
 21. See U.N. Secretary-General, Framework of Actions for the Follow-up to the 
Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and 
Development Beyond 2014, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/69/62 (Feb. 12, 2014), 
http://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/ICPD_beyond2014_EN.pdf. 
 22. The link between women’s political rights and economic vitality is the 
premise of advocacy efforts to address poverty by strengthening the rights of 
women.  See, e.g., MARIA SHRIVER, THE CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE SHRIVER 
REPORT: A WOMAN’S NATION PUSHES BACK FROM THE BRINK 2 (Olivia Morgan & 
Karen Skelton eds. 2014). 
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interventions, economic wealth tends to become increasingly 
concentrated in the hands of those who already have it.23  
Economies may grow alongside improvements in women’s rights, 
but women are not necessarily the beneficiaries of this growth. 
A third sense in which it might make sense to say that 
economic inequality is a woman’s issue is that women’s 
subordination is part of a larger complex of interrelated 
subordinations in which each system interacts with and reinforces 
the other.  By this analysis, women’s subordination shapes and is 
shaped by the logic and reality of an economic system that creates 
vast amounts of income inequality.  The supporting ideology of 
this economic system is, at once, patriarchal and capitalist.  It is 
also racist; as with sex, race is a differentiating factor that this 
complex of interrelated social systems, including the economic 
system, has converted into a basis for subordination.24  
When we view gender and class (and race) as interwoven and 
mutually reinforcing dimensions of the same set of subordinating 
systems, the problem is not only that economic inequality happens 
to fall disproportionately on women or even that the effects of the 
gender and class systems are cumulative, each making the other 
worse.  The problem is also that, structurally, one subordination 
feeds off and helps to support the other.  “Class power produces 
gender power,” MacKinnon writes, suggesting that the converse 
may also be true.25  Because of the relationships between systems 
of subordination, a change in one system of subordination 
“ordinarily creates movement, tension, or contradiction in the 
other.”26  The systems also help to legitimate one another. By 
supporting a particular hierarchy, each system helps to validate 
the idea of hierarchy, making the idea of winners and losers seem 
increasingly inevitable. 
 
 23. Piketty’s theory is that wealth becomes more concentrated in the hands of a 
few as the rate of return on capital exceeds the growth rate of the economy.  Unless 
economic growth is strong enough to exceed the rate of return on capital, the 
benefits of economic growth flow toward those who already have wealth, rather 
than to lift the boats of all.  See PIKETTY, supra note 10, at 26.  Piketty’s work 
shows that this is a historical trend made worse by current economic conditions, 
not an isolated exception.  Id. at 22–25 (summarizing those factors in which 
economic circumstances of groups converge and those factors that cause greater 
and greater divergence associated with the process of accumulation and 
concentration of wealth); id. at 270–85 (providing historical analysis showing that 
accelerating levels of inequality are the norm rather than the exception). 
 24. See Hartmann, supra note 6, at 180. 
 25. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 31 
(1989). 
 26. See Hartmann, supra note 6, at 180. 
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It is this interactive model of subordinating systems that 
shapes the vision and analysis of this Article. 
III. Feminists and Economic Inequality 
Feminists have addressed issues of class and income on 
multiple fronts.  For example, they have advocated for family-
friendly workplaces to reduce the cost to women of getting 
pregnant and being the primary caretakers of their children.27  
They have supported affirmative action to remedy past 
discrimination.28  They have pushed the principle of equal pay for 
equal work.29  They have urged the protection of women’s 
reproductive rights,30 safety from rape and domestic violence,31 
and freedom from sexual harassment32—all of which improve 
 
 27. See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: WOMEN MEN 
WORK FAMILY 207–08 (2015); JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY 
DEBATE: WHY MEN AND CLASS MATTER 1–2 (2010); Herma Hill Kay, Equality and 
Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 2 (1985); Joan C. 
Williams, Reconstructive Feminism: Changing the Way We Talk About Gender and 
Work Thirty Years After the PDA, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 79, 79 (2009); Joan C. 
Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers 
Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 79 (2003). 
 28. See, e.g., Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: 
Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REV. 953, 955 (1996). 
 29. See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Women and Part-Time Work: The Case for Pay 
Equity and Equal Access, 64 N.C. L. Rev. 709 (1986); Deborah Thompson 
Eisenberg, Shattering the Equal Pay Act’s Glass Ceiling, 63 SMU L. REV. 17 (2010); 
Joan C. Williams & Veta Richardson, New Millennium, Same Glass Ceiling? The 
Impact of Law Firm Compensation Systems on Women, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 597 
(2011). 
 30. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Casey and the Clinic 
Closings: When “Protecting Health” Obstructs Choice, 125 YALE L.J. 1428, 1432 
(2016) (arguing that state regulations with no health justification that make it 
necessary for abortion clinics to close violate the Supreme Court’s protection of 
abortion rights); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. 
REV. 955, 955 (1984) (arguing that women’s reproductive rights are fundamental to 
women’s equality); Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive 
Rights: Their Critical Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 
815, 817 (2007) (discussing the “critical understandings and normative 
commitments” of a “sex equality approach to reproductive rights”). 
 31. See, e.g., MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF STATE, supra note 
25, at 171–183 (identifying the patriarchal bias in determinations of coercion and 
consent under the law of rape); Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986) 
(discussing myths and biases within criminal rape law); Elizabeth M. Schneider, 
The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973 (1991) (analyzing the negative effect 
notions of privacy have on familial violence toward women). 
 32. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF 
WORKING WOMEN (1979) (arguing that sexual harassment is sex discrimination); 
Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1169, 1172 (1998) (arguing that sexual harassment is a form of sexual 
discrimination that “preserve[s] male control and entrench[es] masculine norms in 
the workplace”); Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 
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women’s economic circumstances.  They have also pursued a 
number of family law reforms with direct economic benefit for 
women.33 
In all of these areas, feminist reform efforts have had a 
favorable impact on women’s material circumstances.  Yet, as has 
often been noted, these efforts have helped some women more 
than others.34  One reason for this is that the underlying theory 
for these efforts has been largely a theory of gender, not class or 
economic subordination.  Thanks in large part to the work of 
Catharine A. MacKinnon, feminists understand how gender works 
as a system of subordination.  They understand less about 
economic subordination.  They recognize that there is a system of 
women’s gender subordination that has economic consequences 
and, increasingly, that sex and race subordination are connected.  
But they have not adequately considered the critical role that class 
subordination plays in reinforcing and legitimating other forms of 
subordination, including subordination based on sex. 
IV. The Search for a Theory 
Among those who consider economic inequality a severe 
societal problem, it is too often thought of as an unfortunate 
circumstance that someone—the state, private individuals, or 
charitable organizations—should do something about.  This 
impulse is fundamentally a moral one. Moral arguments have 
helped to mobilize public opinion on a number of issues,35 but they 
 
STAN. L. REV. 691, 762–71 (1997) (arguing that sexual harassment serves as an 
underlying factor in the construction of women’s femininity and men’s 
masculinity). 
 33. See, e.g., Joan Williams, Do Wives Own Half? Winning for Wives after 
Wendt, 32 CONN. L. REV. 249 (1999) (arguing in favor of property division rules at 
divorce that better take account of women’s contributions to the marriage). 
 34. For an example of the critique, see Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism 
in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990) and Dorothy Roberts, 
Spiritual and Menial Housework, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 51 (1997); see also 
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 
37 (1987) (“The women that gender neutrality benefits, and there are some, . . . are 
mostly women who have been able to construct a biography that somewhat 
approximates the male norm.”). 
 35. Women’s suffrage and the civil rights of African-Americans, for example, 
used moral arguments to advance their campaigns.  See Megan Gibson, I Am 
Woman, Hear Me Roar: The Suffrage Movement, TIME (Aug. 12, 2011), 
http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2088114_2087975_2
087964,00.html; Andrew Mach, Martin Luther King Jr.: 8 Peaceful Protests that 
Bolstered Civil Rights, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Jan. 15, 2012), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2012/0115/Martin-Luther-King-Jr.-8-peaceful-
protests-that-bolstered-civil-rights/Montgomery-bus-boycott-1955-56.  The “Moral 
Monday” movement in North Carolina has been less successful.  The movement 
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tend to speak only to those who share the same moral premises.  
Without a compelling explanation for and diagnosis of a problem 
that matches the desired prescription—i.e., a theory—moral 
rhetoric lacks both grounding and the power to persuade. 
Anti-stereotyping analysis is one potential source of that 
theory.  Stereotypes about women have been used to explain and 
justify many restrictions on women, and exposing those 
stereotypes has led to the elimination of many of these 
restrictions, especially in the public sphere.36  Similarly, 
eliminating stereotypes about the poor—that they are lazy, 
irresponsible, and cheat the government whenever they can—can 
improve policy solutions with respect to welfare programs, 
housing, state control of women’s reproductive decisions, and 
education.37 
As powerful as anti-stereotyping analysis has been in 
improving opportunities for many women, however, 
generalizations about women, and about the poor, are not always 
false, nor are they necessarily the main problem.  It is a fact, for 
example, that women bear a disproportionate share of caretaking 
responsibilities and that they are especially vulnerable to rape and 
domestic violence.38  Stereotypes lay beneath these facts, but at so 
deep a level that it is not particularly helpful to think in terms of 
women’s present reality being due primarily to mistaken 
assumptions about them.  As Catharine A. MacKinnon has long 
stated, the problem for women concerns less whether they are 
 
protests gubernatorial and legislative actions in that state that, in addition to 
limiting voting rights, abortion rights, and the rights of the LGBT community, have 
widened the income gap between rich and poor, including the former governor’s 
refusal to extend Medicaid benefits for the poor and a ramping up of support for 
school vouchers while the public education system continues to slide.  See Bob 
Geary, Pat McCrory’s Refusal to Extend Medicaid Is a Moral Failure, INDY WEEK 
(Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.indyweek.com/indyweek/pat-mccrorys-refusal-to-expand-
medicaid-is-a-moral-failure/Content?oid=4627343. 
 36. See Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex 
Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 86 (2010); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender 
and the Constitution, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 42 (1975). 
 37. See Barbara Ehrenreich, Time to Wake Up: Stop Blaming Poverty on the 
Poor, SHRIVER REPORT (Jan. 13, 2014), http://shriverreport.org/time-to-wake-up-
stop-blaming-poverty-on-the-poor-barbara-ehrenreich/. 
 38. See MICHELE C. BLACK ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & 
CONTROL, NATIONAL INTIMAE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY: 2010 
SUMMARY REPORT 1–2 (2011), https://www.cdc.gov/ViolencePrevention/
pdf/NISVS_Report2010-a.pdf; BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, AMERICAN TIME USE 
SURVEY—2015 RESULTS 2 (2016), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/atus.pdf 
(finding that on average women spent more time than men on housework, food 
preparation and cleanup, household management, and caring for and helping 
household members, including children, and non-household members). 
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different from, or the same as, men—the question that anti-
stereotyping analysis tries to answer—than how they can equalize 
their power in order to more freely define themselves and pursue 
their own life courses.39 
The reality is that women are subject to a complex web of 
traps and contradictions that normalize their relative lack of 
autonomy and make it seem like the natural order of things.  
Women are valued only through their association with activities 
that are themselves not highly valued because of women’s 
association with them.  Women are raped because they are 
vulnerable, and vulnerable because they are raped.  These facts of 
subordination are reinforced by stereotypes but not fully 
determined by them. 
Stereotypes are also not the only, or even the main, problem 
with being poor. Here, too, the problem is not that stereotypes are 
never true,40 but that the poor lack resources, opportunity, and 
autonomy.41  Economic inequality, like gender subordination, is a 
matter of power, not perception. 
Even if anti-stereotyping analysis had the potential to 
unsettle many of the foundations of power inequities, that 
potential has corroded over time.  Legal historian Deborah Dinner 
has shown how business interests hijacked the anti-stereotyping 
principle in order to advance a deregulatory agenda and unravel 
legal protections for labor.42  It is a sign of the success of the 
business agenda, Dinner argues, that courts have consistently 
limited the anti-stereotyping principle to the claims of individuals 
barred from opportunities because of inaccurate assumptions 
made about them, and failed to apply the principle when it might 
have eliminate inequities targeted against classes of working 
women.43  This curtailment is partly explained by the fact that 
earlier worker protections for women were based on traditional 
stereotypes about women that served as pretexts for keeping 
women in their place—giving both stereotypes and worker 
 
 39. See MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 25, 
at 218 (“[G]ender is more an inequality of power than a differentiation that is 
accurate or inaccurate.”); id. at 229 (“Stereotyping—inaccurate or exaggerated 
misreflections—is the archetypal liberal injury.”).   
 40. See J.D. VANCE, HILLBILLY ELEGY: A MEMOIR OF A FAMILY AND CULTURE IN 
CRISIS (2016) (chronicling self-defeating behaviors in which many poor people 
engage). 
 41. See Ehrenreich, supra note 37. 
 42. See Dinner, supra note 20, at 5. 
 43. Id. 
2017] FEMINISM AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 275 
protections a bad name.44  But when courts found these 
protections to be unconstitutional, advocates abandoned them in 
favor of an individual-centered anti-stereotyping principle, instead 
of reshaping them to support a more robust, gender-neutral set of 
protections for the working class.  This individualized approach 
helped highly educated women get good jobs, Dinner contends, but 
has done little for women in low paying, highly fungible and often 
unsafe jobs.45 
An alternative way to theorize economic inequality is as a 
product of race and/or gender subordination.  Through statistics 
showing racially skewed prison populations, a two-tiered 
education system, high minority unemployment figures, and low 
minority marriage rates, critical race scholars have shown how 
race—and racism—determines winners and losers in all aspects of 
life.46  Likewise, by documenting disparities in wages, the 
gendered effects of divorce, disproportionate child care 
expectations between men and women, and rates of sexual 
violence, feminist theorists have tied various types of gender 
inequalities to systematic bias against women.47 
Although these race and gender critiques powerfully show 
how both racism and sexism stack the deck against women and 
minorities, they describe the effects of subordination rather than 
explain its means of operation and success.  Sex and race critiques 
prove what motivates—explicitly or implicitly—those who exercise 
power in society,48 and predict which particular people occupy the 
lowest rungs in social relations.49  This evidence alone, however, 
does not show how racism and sexism have been normalized, nor 
how these systems cover their tracks as systems.  A fuller 
 
 44. Id. at 1. 
 45. Id. at 5. 
 46. See, e.g., RALPH RICHARD BANKS, IS MARRIAGE FOR WHITE PEOPLE? HOW 
THE AFRICAN AMERICAN MARRIAGE DECLINE AFFECTS EVERYONE (2011) (examining 
the consequences of marriage decline among African Americans); Olatunde C. 
Johnson, Disparity Rules, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 374 (2007) (identifying and 
analyzing racial disparities and the “complex mechanisms that sustain 
contemporary racial inequality”). 
 47. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION 
AND THE LAW 1 (1989) (analyzing how the law “reflects, reinforces, [and] challenges 
persistent patterns of inequality”). 
 48. See, e.g., Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination, in 2 
THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 357 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 
1998) (analyzing theories of discrimination); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content 
of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal 
Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995) (discussing processes of 
unintentional discrimination). 
 49. See Hartmann, supra note 6, at 180. 
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economic theory would show not only how power is distributed 
along race and gender lines, but also how those who benefit under 
that distribution of power get away with it. 
What both anti-stereotyping analysis and theories of sexism 
and racism lack is direct engagement with the principles and 
processes by which the economic system creates and sustains 
unfair social hierarchies.  Karl Marx exemplified this engagement 
in explaining how capitalism creates a class system under which 
those endowed with capital are allowed to expropriate the work of 
others and reinvest the profits for their own gain, thereby 
ensuring the expansion and normalization of their economic 
supremacy.50  
The global economic system has evolved substantially since 
Marx’s time as state institutions and practices helped to manage 
or soften the effects of capitalism and economic conditions after 
World War II sustained sufficiently rapid economic growth to even 
out its excesses.51 Globalization, technological change, 
deregulation, and the privatization of public functions have 
weakened those constraints,52 as have state policies committed to 
preserving and strengthening “free” markets.53  Capitalism is no 
longer a pure system, but current conditions and the ideology that 
helps to sustain those conditions borrow directly from that system.   
The ideological grounding of today’s economic system is often 
referred to as neoliberalism, or market libertarianism.  
Neoliberalism is a set of arguments and premises that, according 
to David Grewal and Jedediah Purdy, are “united by their 
tendency to support market imperatives and unequal economic 
power in the context of political conflicts that are characteristic of 
the present historical moment.”54  The alternative terminology of 
market libertarianism is more descriptive of the ideology’s reliance 
on free markets. For present purposes, the two ideologies are the 
same.  Both hold that society collectively benefits from 
unregulated markets because they are the most efficient means 
through which equilibrium is established between what people, 
 
 50. KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 69–70 
(Joseph Katz ed., Samuel Moore trans., Simon & Schuster 1964) (1888); Hartmann, 
supra note 6, at 173. 
 51. See PIKETTY, supra note 10, at 266, 376. 
 52. See generally PAUL MASON, POSTCAPITALISM: A GUIDE TO OUR FUTURE 
(2015) (discussing how changes in information technology have impacted 
capitalism). 
 53. See WOLFGANG STREECK, BUYING TIME: THE DELAYED CRISIS OF 
DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM (Patrick Camiller trans. 2014). 
 54. Grewal & Purdy, supra note 4, at 2. 
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pursuing their own preferences, are willing to pay for what other 
people, pursuing their own self-interest, are willing to sell.55  This 
efficiency depends upon strong property rights and the absence of 
government intervention.56  Any state tampering with market 
mechanisms, neoliberalists insist, will interfere with the natural 
mechanisms that make markets so efficient.57 
Neoliberalism has a political dimension as well as an 
economic one.  It opposes intervention by the state not only 
because that interference hinders economic efficiency but also 
because it diminishes the liberty of the individual to make choices 
based on his or her own preferences, to exercise his or her own 
initiative and reap the benefits and losses of that initiative, to 
keep what he or she has earned, and to spend it as he or she 
pleases.58  The efficiency and liberty rationales work together: the 
freedom of individuals to pursue their own preferences and goals 
maximizes the wealth and welfare of the community.59  When 
markets are so rationalized, it follows that the basis of the state’s 
legitimacy is more its ability to enable and improve individual 
agency in the market than to facilitate the common welfare.60 
V. Market Libertarianism and Feminism 
Feminists have attacked the premises of neoliberalism and 
market libertarianism from various vantage points.  Feminist 
sociologists describe the reality that market-supporting policies 
have produced—in particular, the increasing gap in economic 
security between rich and poor, the disproportionate poverty of 
women and children, and the inability of many people to get by on 
the resources they have available.61  Politicians argue that 
ignoring the poor is not “who we are,”62 and appeal to our self-
 
 55. Id. at 6. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See id. at 173. 
 58. See, e.g., id. at 13 (“[I]n the picture of economic life that neoliberalism 
celebrates, the touchstone act of personal choice is . . . the consumer purchase.”); 
see also Martha T. McCluskey, Constitutional Economic Justice: Structural Power 
for “We the People”, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 273 (2016) (arguing that the 
constitutional vision of economic minimalism “has supported and rationalized 
economic inequality by defining constitutional freedom and justice in terms of 
individualized choice”).  
 59. See Dinner, supra note 20, at 9; Grewal & Purdy, supra note 4, at 10–11. 
 60. Dinner, supra note 20, at 10. 
 61. See KATHRYN J. EDIN & H. LUKE SHAEFER, $2.00 A DAY: LIVING ON ALMOST 
NOTHING IN AMERICA (2015); see also BARBARA EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND DIMED: 
ON (NOT) GETTING BY IN AMERICA (2001). 
 62. David Rutz, 46 Times President Obama Told Americans “That’s Not Who 
278 Law & Inequality [Vol. 35: 265 
interest with arguments that the absence of a genuine opportunity 
to work hard, play by the rules, and live decently threatens 
democracy.63  Political theorists point out that there is no such 
thing as an unregulated market, and that government decisions 
about what to legislate, whom to tax, and how to spend are value 
choices that help some people at the expense of others.64  Critiques 
of neoliberal theory, including feminist economists and legal 
scholars, challenge the assumption that all actors in the system 
are self-interested and profit-seeking.65  They also challenge the 
assumption that tastes are exogenous rather than cultivated 
within and by the terms of the system.66  They question theories of 
value that accept that what is paid for something is the true 
measure of its value,67 assumptions about the efficiency of free 
markets,68 and theories of deadweight loss alleged to be caused by 
market interference.69  They reject the dichotomy between the 
state and the market that underlies free market ideologies,70 as 
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well as prevailing societal myths about independence and 
autonomy.71 
These critiques provide a corrective to some of the factual 
mistakes of neoliberalism, much as feminists in earlier days 
corrected some of the mistaken stereotypes about women.  This 
work is invaluable to an understanding of how the economic 
system, like the system that subordinates women, rests on various 
attractive-sounding fictions that do not bear up under critical 
scrutiny.  What they do not fully provide, however, is an 
explanation of how a system built upon such weak foundations 
survives.  How did we come to think so highly of a system that has 
produced such inequalities, and how does such an unequal society 
continue to sustain itself?   
What feminists are missing with respect to economic 
inequality is what Catharine A. MacKinnon gave us in Toward a 
Feminist Theory of the State when she explained how a democracy 
built on the liberal principles of equality and freedom manages, 
despite its high-sounding ideals, to systematically subordinate 
women.72  Given the foundational nature of that explanation and 
its potential parallels to economic inequality, it makes sense to 
dissect the components of MacKinnon’s analysis and see what 
parts of it might be useful for a companion feminist theory of 
economic inequality.  Accordingly, the next section reviews the 
basic elements of MacKinnon’s theory of women’s subordination.  
The result is not in itself a complete theory.  There remain a 
number of normative issues to work out concerning such matters 
as what constitutes an unacceptable level of economic inequality, 
and what the precise relationship between gender and economic 
equality is or ought to be.  Still, MacKinnon changed the way we 
think about theory as well as the way we think about gender.  The 
power of her analysis makes her theory a good place to start to 
build a feminist theory of economic inequality. 
VI. Catharine MacKinnon’s Theory of Women’s 
Subordination: The Basics 
The theory of women’s subordination in Toward a Feminist 
Theory of the State contains a number of important components.  
Some of these, themselves derived from Marxist critiques of 
 
147–48 (arguing against the neoclassical assumption that markets operate 
independently of government). 
 71. See, e.g., FINEMAN, supra note 64 (challenging the myth of autonomy and 
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 72. See MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 25. 
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capitalism, are readily available to a contemporary theory of 
economic inequality, although this theory need not necessarily be 
the specific, totalizing system of Marxism.  Others require more 
translation and adaptation.  This section sets forth the basic 
components of MacKinnon’s theory, with suggestions for their 
utility to a feminist theory of economic inequality. 
First, at the heart of Toward a Feminist Theory of the State is 
a robust theory of how the exercise of power disguises itself as 
natural, good, and obvious.  The phenomenon that power exercises 
itself through principles sounding in general welfare was 
extensively developed in the context of class struggle by Karl 
Marx, whom MacKinnon explicitly credits.  MacKinnon’s novel 
contribution was to apply to sex the principle that social and 
political arrangements that appear to be givens are, in fact, the 
result of how power is distributed in society.73  Previously, sex was 
off limits to this kind of analysis because it was widely assumed 
that sex is a dimension of social relationships that is inherent, 
biological and fixed.  MacKinnon showed that sex, too, is a reality 
constructed through social relations.74 
One does not need to be committed to Marxism to see the 
centrality of this insight to a critical theory of economic inequality.  
Just as feminism is about the distribution of power between men 
and women, and only derivatively about sex differences and 
stereotyping, class and economic inequality are about how power 
is distributed, rather than any inherent differences between rich 
and poor. 
Second, MacKinnon pointed out how power disguises its own 
exercise through a specific set of social activities.  For this, again, 
she draws heavily on analogies to Marxist theory.  Marx theorized 
that power is allocated according to one’s position in the wage-
work system.  Owners of the means of production exploit workers 
by paying them less than the value of what they produce.  They 
then accumulate the profits of that exploitation, thereby elevating 
themselves to a position from which they can continue to exploit 
those who work for them.75  MacKinnon recognized that the 
meaning of sex and the social relations it creates are similarly 
determined according to how power is allocated within the sex 
system.  “Sexuality is the social process through which social 
relations of gender are created, organized, expressed, and directed, 
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creating the social beings we know as women and men . . . .”76  “As 
work is to Marxism,” MacKinnon writes, “sexuality to feminism is 
socially constructed yet constructing . . . .”77 
MacKinnon also insisted, as did Marx and other critical 
theorists, that the relevant unit of social theory analysis is the 
group, not the individual.78  This centrality of the group is 
sometimes hard to recognize, insofar as power in a liberal system 
is exercised through an ideology of the individual.  MacKinnon 
helped to show that women, despite their enormous diversity as 
individuals, were affected similarly as women.79 
Fourth, MacKinnon’s theory is a theory of the state.  The 
state oversees who counts, whose interests matter, and what rules 
control how much people get and at whose expense.  Even when 
the state purports to leave people alone, it distributes resources 
and allocates power in the way it chooses to regulate, tax, and 
spend.  The exercise of its power determines what is legitimate, 
and that legitimacy, in turn, both justifies and conceals the 
exercise of power.80  Law is both power itself, and power’s mask.81 
The problem of economic inequality implicates a number of 
issues relating to the state that MacKinnon did not explicitly 
address, since class was not her primary concern.  These issues 
include whether, or to what extent, economic inequality is even a 
problem.  As Jedediah Purdy observes, if the purpose of the state 
is to guarantee an individualistic, free market-based economic 
regime, then the economic inequality produced within that regime 
is not really a problem.82  If, on the other hand, the state is 
committed to the democratic principle of full and equal citizenship, 
economic inequality “predispos[es] political judgment in favor of 
the present economic regime” and is thus a serious concern.83  
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Whether and to what extent economic inequality is a problem also 
depends, Purdy explains, upon what goods are freely available, 
without purchase.84  If education, health care, and other basic 
securities are already guaranteed by the state, economic 
inequality is not the same kind of problem as when even the most 
basic goods must be purchased in the market.85  Both of these 
factors suggest that current levels of economic inequality are 
unacceptable, but there remains the question how much inequality 
is too much. 
A fifth component of MacKinnon’s theory of women’s 
subordination is an account of how victims participate in their own 
subordination.  Women, she argues, often buy into the terms of the 
social reality that constructs them.86  Indeed, for MacKinnon, the 
genius of the system of sex subordination is its ability to convince 
the women exploited by it to accept the system as natural, fair, 
and good.87  So, too, are the victims of the economic system often 
its biggest supporters.88 
Sixth, and critical to MacKinnon’s theory because it offers a 
glimpse of the way out of the seemingly airtight system of male 
supremacy that she describes, including the co-option of its 
victims, MacKinnon takes an approach to knowledge that does not 
pretend that knowledge can stand apart from commitments, 
experience, and feelings.  MacKinnon writes: 
Feminism does not begin with the premise that it is 
unpremised.  It does not aspire to persuade an unpremised 
audience, because there is no such audience.  Its project is to 
uncover and claim as valid the experience of women, the major 
content of which is the devalidation of women’s experience.89   
This understanding of knowledge as an interested, iterative 
process supports an appreciation of politics as local, and gives 
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meaning to the adage that the personal is political.  It is an 
understanding that is also key to how an economic system 
supported by high-minded principles might eventually, through 
the collective telling of the experiences of its victims, be undone. 
Finally, MacKinnon’s theory explicitly addresses the 
relationship between feminism and other forms of subordination, 
including class subordination.90  Nearly half of Toward a Feminist 
Theory of the State is devoted to the relationship between 
feminism and Marxism.  MacKinnon asks how two social processes 
can both be so fundamental, and whether they are complementary 
or cross-cutting.91  She asks to what extent capitalism is 
predicated on sex inequality, and whether male dominance is a 
creation of capitalism or capitalism is one expression of male 
dominance.92  She asks what “it mean[s] for class analysis if a 
social group is defined and exploited through means that seem 
largely independent of the organization of production” and, 
conversely, what “it mean[s] for a sex-based analysis if capitalism 
might not be materially altered if it were fully sex integrated or 
even controlled by women.”93 
MacKinnon does not answer all of these questions.  Her focus 
throughout Toward a Feminist Theory of the State is the delivery 
of a theory of feminism, much of which she explains through its 
parallels to the materialist methods of Marxism, without 
attempting to propose a full synthesis of the two.94  For 
MacKinnon, it is important that feminism retains its own identity 
because, as a historical matter, when feminism has merged with 
other movements, it has tended to become submerged within the 
other movement.95  But she also goes on to discuss the various 
terms on which feminist theory and a critique of capitalism might 
 
 90. See, e.g., MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 34, at 2 (“We 
urgently need to comprehend the emerging pattern in which gender, while a 
distinct inequality, also contributes to the social embodiment and expression of 
race and class inequalities . . . .”). 
 91. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 25, at 
4. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. The chapter that comes closest is entitled Attempts at Synthesis, and 
explores three alternative models for reconciling feminism and Marxism: “equate 
and collapse,” “derive and subordinate,” and “substitute contradictions.”  Id. at 60–
80. 
 95. See id. at 11; see also Hartmann, supra note 6, at 172 (stating similarly that 
“[r]ecent attempts to integrate Marxism and feminism are 
unsatisfactory . . . because they subsume the feminist struggle into the larger 
struggle against capital.”). 
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relate to one another, finding most promising an approach she 
calls “substitute contradictions,” in which the “category identified 
by each theory is taken as valid by the other and methods are 
cross-applied.”96 
MacKinnon provides some of the key methodological tools 
and insights necessary to achieve a feminist theory of economic 
inequality.  These insights suggest important connections between 
sex and class subordination.  They demonstrate that class mobility 
for women does not free them of the constraints of gender and, 
likewise, that freeing women from gender constraints does not 
necessarily free them from class-based or race-based 
subordination.  They indicate that inequality is not necessarily the 
accidental byproduct of a system but often its intended 
consequence.  They show how subordination can rationalize the 
system that produces it by appearing to prove who deserves to 
win, and thus how having losers vindicates winners.  
The job for a feminist theory of economic inequality is to use 
these and other insights to explode the rationalizations that 
sustain the interlocking and overlapping systems of sex and class 
subordination and thereby to delegitimize the vast inequalities 
these systems have produced.  
VII. Targeting Inequality, Not Poverty 
In developing a feminist theory of economic inequality, it is 
important that the target of the theory be inequality rather than 
poverty. The terms are often used interchangeably, but they are 
not the same thing.97  Some philosophers say that poverty refers to 
an absolute measure of welfare, sometimes referred to as 
biological poverty, or what is necessary to stay afloat physically or 
medically.  Economic inequality, in contrast, is about relative 
resources.  It is sometimes called social poverty, to highlight its 
grounding in social relations rather than some given or natural 
order.98  But the distinction between biological and social poverty 
 
 96. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 25, at 
63. 
 97. See generally JONATHAN WOLFF ET AL., JOSEPH ROWNTREE FOUNDATION, A 
PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW OF POVERTY (2015), https://www.jrf.org.uk/report/
philosophical-review-poverty (scroll to bottom of page; under “Download” heading, 
click “Full Report” button) (providing a breakdown of the numerous ways in which 
poverty has been understood by philosophers). 
 98. See YUVAL NOAH HARARI, SAPIENS, A BRIEF HISTORY OF HUMANKIND 266 
(2015); see also Brenda Shaw, Poverty: Absolute or Relative, 5 J. APPLIED PHIL. 27, 
27 (1988) (“Poverty can be defined objectively and applied consistently only in 
terms of the concept of relative deprivation.”). 
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is misleading.  First, minimum standards of adequate food, 
shelter, education, and other related basic needs change over time, 
shifting both up and down. Who would think today that families 
can meet their basic subsistence needs in the U.S. on the average 
income in tribal cultures who live off the land? (Or, one might ask, 
the minimum wage?)  Second, although it is true that poverty 
speaks to the amount of resources while economic inequality 
speaks to their distribution, poverty definitions are, themselves, 
choices society makes about how much is enough. What 
constitutes poverty is a judgment call, not an absolute measure.  
Poverty is a relationship between people who hold different 
positions of power,99 just as equality is.100 
The distinction between poverty and inequality matters 
because it affects the reasons for acting and thus whether, and 
what kind of, action is called for.  Poverty is generally understood 
as an unfortunate circumstance that, by virtue of it being 
unfortunate, we have a moral obligation to address.  There may 
also be self-serving, pragmatic reasons relating to the prevention 
of the costly problems of crime and teenage pregnancy, which are 
often associated with poverty.101  But from Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
New Deal and Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty102 to 
contemporary defenses of the economic status quo,103 programs 
designated as poverty programs have been considered a 
 
 99. See TEPPO ESKELINEN, PUTTING GLOBAL POVERTY IN CONTEXT: A 
PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY ON POWER, JUSTICE AND ECONOMY 20 (2009) (stating that 
poverty is brought about by political structures or social arrangements rather than 
ethical failures or accidents); see also MARSHALL SAHLINS, STONE AGE ECONOMICS 
37 (1974) (stating that “poverty is not a certain small amount of goods,” but “a 
relation between people.”). 
 100. See Samuel Scheffler, Choice, Circumstance, and the Value of Equality, 4 
POLITICS, PHIL. & ECON. 5, 17 (2005). 
 101. See Morgan Kelly, Inequality and Crime, 82 REV. ECON. & STAT. 530, 530 
(2000) (finding a correlation between inequality and violent crime, although not 
property crime); Melissa Schettini Kearney & Phillip B. Levine, Why Is the Teen 
Birth Rate in the United States So High and Why Does It Matter? 18–19 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 17965, 2012), http://www.nber.org/
papers/w17965.pdf (finding that poverty causes higher rates of teenage pregnancy). 
 102. See Dylan Matthews, Everything You Need to Know About the War On 
Poverty, WASH. POST (Jan. 8, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
wonk/wp/2014/01/08/everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-war-on-poverty/?utm_
term=.e9c3f0460ef4; Peter Marcuse, Poverty or Inequality: Does It Matter?, 
INEQUALITY.ORG (Jan. 28, 2015), http://inequality.org/why-economic-language-
matters/. 
 103. See, e.g., Deirdre N. McCloskey, Growth, Not Forced Equality, Saves the 
Poor, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/23/business/
growth-not-forced-equality-saves-the-poor.html (“What matters ethically is that the 
poor have a roof over their heads and enough to eat. . . .  Equalizing possession of 
Rolexes does not.”). 
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manifestation of voluntary generosity toward those most in need of 
help from others.   
Viewing the problem as one of inequality and maldistribution 
redefines the problem, suggesting not only that some people do not 
have enough, but also, as a direct result of the inequities that 
cause some people to have too little, that some people have too 
much.  The underlying inequities create an obligation that 
transcends charity.  They create a mandatory obligation on the 
part of those who have enjoyed favoritism under the existing 
systems of privilege.  When the problem is simply poverty, it can 
be addressed within the terms of the existing economic system; 
people who have too much can voluntarily shift some of their 
bounty to those who don’t have enough.  But if the problem is that 
some people have been the beneficiaries of a system that is rigged 
in their favor, the only real solution is that the seemingly 
beneficent assumptions of the system be exposed and discredited, 
and the system changed.   
Being charitable toward others may imply something positive 
about the quality of a person’s character, and also reflects that 
person’s vision of the kind of society in which he or she wishes to 
live.  Charity is a virtue, but not one that necessarily implies any 
negative judgment about the existing political and economic 
system.  A justice-based view of income inequality also expresses a 
commitment about the kind of society we should have,104 but, in 
contrast to a charity-based view, it does imply a negative judgment 
about the existing political and economic system and a need for 
action. 
Conclusion  
Catharine A. MacKinnon did not ask for empathy on behalf of 
women.  She did not say “have a heart, you will feel better if you 
treat women better, if you pay them as much as you pay men, if 
you do not beat them up or rape them; do us a favor, please do not 
force them into prostitution and the pornography industry.”  
Instead she developed a critique that named the system, explained 
how it sustains itself through power and the illusion of freedom, 
identified its victims, and named its perpetrators.  She made the 
link between women’s victimhood and the complex system of 
 
 104. See, e.g., Arthur MacEwan, An End in Itself and a Means to Good Ends: 
Why Income Equality is Important 8 (Ctr. for Soc. Policy, Working Paper No. 2009-
2, 2009), http://scholarworks.umb.edu/csp_pubs/25/ (making the case for income 
equality as an end in itself because “it is a foundation for the type of social relations 
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principles and power relationships that produces that victimhood.  
This critique was harder to ignore and did not leave room for 
charity or volunteerism.  It was an imperative. 
So, too, with economic inequality.  As “feminism has 
unmasked maleness as a form of power that is both omnipotent 
and nonexistent, an unreal thing with very real consequences,”105 
so a robust critique of market libertarianism unmasks a system 
that is advanced as free and best for us all and reveals that system 
as a man-made, exercise of power, with the very real and unjust 
consequence of wealth concentration in the hands of the few at the 
expense of the rest.  The systems of subordination work together.  
So should their critiques.  
 
 105. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 25, at 
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